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1. Introduction 
 
In previous research, I have claimed that relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 
1995) is a valid cognitive pragmatics framework to explain how humorous effects 
are generated, both from the processing of jokes (Yus 1997, 2003, 2008, 2012a, 
2012b) and from the processing of longer discourses such as stand-up comedy 
monologues (Yus 2002, 2004, 2005). This paper aims to show how the speaker’s 
humorous intention is devised and how humorous effects are generated in the 
audience by analyzing 1000 randomly collected jokes and checking how they fit 
into any of the seven types of jokes that are predicted in the Intersecting Circles 
Model of humorous communication (Yus forthcoming). The paper is organized as 
follows: First, I provide a brief comment on the cognitive foundation of relevance 
theory and the inferential steps that hearers go through in the interpretation of 
utterances according to this theory. Second, I comment on how these steps can be 
manipulated for the sake of humor. Next, comments on a previous classification of 
jokes are provided. Finally, the Intersecting Circles Model of humorous 
communication (henceforth ICM) is outlined and the corpus of jokes is analyzed to 
check how they fit into the seven types of jokes that this Model comprises. 
 
 
2. Relevance theory and human cognition 
 
Research within relevance theory assumes that all cognitive activity of the human 
mind is relevance-oriented. Inputs for mental processing are attended to because 
we have developed a tendency to search for their optimal relevance. This is 
captured in the cognitive principle of relevance: “Human cognition tends to be 
geared to the maximization of relevance.” According to Wilson and Sperber (2002: 
251), “relevance is a potential property not only of utterances and other observable 
phenomena, but of thoughts, memories and conclusions of inferences.” Concerning 
our thoughts, these are also graded by relevance, since some of them are more 
likely to be entertained than others in a particular situation. In general, any external 
stimulus or internal representation that accesses our cognitive system may be 
  
relevant to us at some time and we have an evolved ability to pick up potentially 
relevant stimuli. For an input to be relevant, it has to combine fruitfully with 
context to yield interesting outcomes (“positive cognitive effects” in relevance-
theoretic terminology). Indeed, human cognition is constantly gathering 
information and combining it with contextual information to yield relevant 
conclusions. For this to happen, the potential interest of the input should not 
demand excessive processing effort in return. In this sense, if extra effort is 
demanded (for instance, when the interpretation is communicated as an implicature 
which requires a lot of contextualization), this effort should be compensated for 
with additional cognitive effects. Humans invariably tend to select the most 
accessible and effort-relieving interpretation by default unless this interpretation 
proves not to be relevant enough, for example when more context needs to be 
accessed in order to reach an adequate interpretation. Jokers often foresee their 
interlocutors’ tendency to select interpretations in terms of accessibility and 
potential relevance and manipulate this tendency with alternative unpredicted 
interpretations (more on this below). 
 To summarize, four are the basic assumptions of relevance theory (Wilson 
1994: 44). These will be exemplified with Mike’s answer in (1) and the range of its 
possible interpretations in (2) below. As will be described in the next Sections, the 
same cognitive properties that make human comprehension possible, are also at 
work in the generation of humorous effects. 
 
(1) John: Now, tell me, how’s your girlfriend? 
 Mike: She’s no longer my girlfriend. 
 John: Oh! I am really sorry... I really thought you got on very well with each other. 
 Mike: No! I mean... she is now my wife! We got married last month. 
 John: Oh! I see... Congratulations! I had no idea! 
(2) a. She’s not my girlfriend because my girlfriend has died. 
 b. She’s not my girlfriend because my girlfriend and I split up. 
 c. She’s not my girlfriend because my girlfriend and I are now married. 
 
The first theoretical assumption of relevance theory is that every utterance has a 
variety of possible interpretations, all compatible with the information that is 
linguistically encoded. In (1), Mike’s answer has a number of possible 
interpretations (2a-c), all of which are compatible with this utterance and, on paper, 
possible in the context in which it is uttered ((2a-c) are “manifest” in relevance-
theoretic terminology). 
 The second assumption is that not all these interpretations occur to the hearer 
simultaneously; some of them take more effort to think up. John chooses 
interpretation (2b) because it takes less effort to arrive at than interpretation (a) or 
(c). After all, “splitting up” is the most typical reason why a woman stops being a 
man’s girlfriend. 
  
 The third assumption is that hearers are equipped with a single, general 
cognitive criterion for evaluating the relevance of potential interpretations. Indeed, 
humans are fast at evaluating interpretations, to the extent that John does not even 
realize that there are alternative interpretations (2a) and (2c) when he selects (2b) 
as the intended one. 
 Finally, this criterion is powerful enough to exclude all but a single 
interpretation, so that having found an interpretation that fits the criterion, the 
hearer looks no further. In the example above, once John selects (2b) as the 
intended interpretation, he does not consider the possibility that there might be 
other competing interpretations such as (2a) and (2c). 
 
 
3. Comprehension according to relevance theory 
 
Relevance theory claims that comprehension involves (a little bit of) decoding and 
(a great deal of) inference. Each chunk of text is decoded by a specialized module 
of the brain and turned into (part of) the logical form of the utterance. This is the 
only context-free phase of utterance interpretation. The logical form is a 
grammatical string of words which is communicatively useless unless it is enriched 
pragmatically and turned into a relevant contextualized proposition. As shown in 
Figure 1, utterance interpretation involves a mutual parallel adjustment of (a) 
inferential operations to yield the explicit content of the utterance or explicature; 
(b) the retrieval of implicated premises and derivation of implicated conclusions or 
implicatures (if necessary); and (c) the access to as much contextual information as 
necessary to obtain (a) and (b). 
 
 
Figure 1. Interpretation as mutual parallel adjustment of explicature  
(expl.), implicature (impl.) and context (con.). 
 
  
 The enrichment of the logical form to obtain its explicit interpretation 
(explicature) involves  several possible inferential procedures such as reference 
assignment (especially for indexicals, adverbs, etc. as in (3a)), disambiguation (of 
polysemous words, as in (3b)), free enrichment of non-coded elements (3c); and 
adjustment of concepts, when the coded concept is altered to meet the expectations 
of relevance (leading to the inferential construction of an ad hoc concept that only 
resembles the coded one in some respect), either by turning it into a more specific 
or narrower concept, as in (3d), or by turning it into a less specific or broader 
concept, as in (3e): 
 
(3) a. I saw her there with him. 
   I saw [whom?] there [where?] with him [whom?]. 
 b. I came across Thomas this morning. He was at a bank. 
   [river bank? financial institution?]. 
 c. I think Ann is better. 
   I think Ann is better [than whom?] [for what?]. 
 d. John drinks too much. 
   John [drinks alcohol] too much. 
 e. I’ll be ready in two minutes. 
   I’ll be ready [in a while]. 
 
 And the explicature, together with contextual information, is used as a premise 
for the derivation of implicatures (if intended). Contextual assumptions are needed 
both for the retrieval of implicated premises and for the derivation of implicated 
conclusions, as in the hypothetical (4b) and (4c) below: 
 
(4) a.   Mike: Are you going to next Saturday’s party? 
   Ann: My parents are away this weekend. 
 b. Implicated premise: Ann has to look after her grand-mother when her parents are 
away. 
 c.  Implicated conclusion: Ann won’t be able to go to next Saturday’s party. 
 
 During comprehension, hearers often make anticipatory hypotheses and can 
derive implications even before the explicit interpretation of the utterance has been 
fully processed. This has often been underlined as important for incongruity-
resolution in humor, although predictions are often made for “frame congruence” 
rather than for actual content (Dynel 2012a: 8). Similarly, hearers are often forced 
to backtracking when the subsequent stretch of discourse invalidates the 
assumptions brought to bear so far in the interpretation of the utterance. This is 
also typical of jokes fitting the incongruity-resolution pattern. In any case, as 
represented in Figure 1, interpreting an utterance is an incremental heuristic in 
which the assumptions obtained from the processing of previous chunks of text 
form a preliminary context for the interpretation of subsequent chunks (Dynel 
  
2012b: 158), an inferential procedure that may be exploited for the sake of humor 
(see below). As Ritchie (2004: 49) correctly stresses, “the oddity of incongruity 
does not involve a configuration of objects perceived all at the same time, but the 
temporal sequence of events or ideas creates the effect.” 
 
 
4. Relevance theory, humor and joke classification 
 
Although humans cannot enter other people’s minds, we are endowed with a mind-
reading ability that aids in metarepresenting other people’s thoughts, together with 
predictions of context accessibility and mutuality of assumptions. Therefore, 
speakers can predict that certain interpretive steps will be taken, that one of the 
senses of a word is bound to be picked up because it offers a better balance of 
cognitive effects and processing effort, or that certain background assumptions will 
be retrieved from context for the derivation of implicatures. In a nutshell, speakers 
can somehow foresee the inferential steps of the interlocutor and act upon them as 
part of their humorous strategy. In fact, all the steps of interpretation commented 
upon in Section 3 above can be manipulated in jokes: the context-free extraction of 
the logical form of the utterance, the inferential enrichment of the coded words 
(reference assignment, disambiguation, free enrichment and concept adjustment) 
and the access to contextual assumptions needed for the retrieval of implicated 
premises and the derivation of implicated conclusions (cf. Yus, 2003, 2008). 
 Relevance theory also predicts that, upon interpreting the utterance, the hearer 
will make sense of a proper scenario for the joke in the form of schemas, frames, 
scripts, etc. (see below for my proposal of the unifying term make-sense frame); 
and this scenario may also be manipulated for the sake of humor. For instance, the 
incongruity-resolution pattern of humor fits this manipulation (which may also rely 
on a linguistic focus of incongruity, besides frames; see Suls 1972: 82, Ritchie 
2009: 11). 
 The different areas of interpretation that can be manipulated as part of the 
intention to generate humorous effects constitute the basis for classifications of 
jokes made in previous research (cf. Yus 2003, 2008, 2012a, 2012b). Figure 2 
shows one of the latest proposals. The chart starts with a differentiation between 
intentional humor and unintentional humor, the latter not covered by a pragmatics 
of humorous communication. Then, a distinction is made between the jokes which 
are integrated into the on-going conversation (and hence catch the interlocutor by 
surprise) and those which are not (canned jokes, typically preceded by markers 
such as “have you heard the one...?”). In both cases, jokes are then divided into 
those whose humorous effects lie in the manipulation of the inferential steps 
leading to an interpretation of the joke, and those which simply strengthen (or 
  
occasionally contradict) social and cultural stereotypes regarding national features, 
sex roles, professions, celebrities, connoted places, etc. 
 
 
Figure 2. A relevance-theoretic classification of jokes (Yus 2008, 2012a). 
  
 For the former (utterance-centered humor), two basic strategies are cited: the 
incongruity-resolution pattern, and what has been labeled “multiple graded 
interpretations strategy” (Yus 2003: 1309), which also covers the “incongruity-
resolution” model (Suls 1972), the “forced-reinterpretation model” (Ritchie 2004, 
2006), the “marked informativeness criterion” (Giora 1991) and the “garden-path 
mechanism” (Dynel 2012b). According to this strategy, the speaker plays with 
multiple interpretations of the joke which are graded according to their 
accessibility. Finally, the next layer in Figure 2 covers all the sub-strategies 
centered upon the aforementioned steps leading to an interpretation of the joke 
(reference assignment, disambiguation...). 
 
 
5. The Intersecting Circles Model (ICM) of humorous 
communication 
 
Although I never meant the types of jokes represented in Figure 2 to be mutually 
exclusive (especially the utterance-centered versus the cultural stereotype-connoted 
  
division), this classification has been criticized on these grounds (cf. Dynel 2010, 
2012b; Biegajło 2012). However, I do consider the role of different sources of 
humor and their combination in single instances of jokes worth pursuing. This is 
why in Yus (forthcoming) a brand new proposal of classification is suggested in 
which it is claimed that all jokes involve the speaker’s prediction (and/or 
manipulation) of certain interpretive steps and context accessibility within three 
areas generically labeled Circles: (a) the make-sense frame (the overall 
interpretation of the scenario depicted in the joke), (b) the cultural frame 
(encyclopedic information concerning cultural and social stereotypes on religions, 
sex roles, connoted places, celebrities, etc.), and (c) utterance interpretation (the 
inferential steps taken to turn the words of the joke into a meaningful 
interpretation).
2
 The combination of these circles make up the ICM of humorous 
communication comprising seven types of jokes (Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3. The Intersecting Circles Model (ICM) of humorous communication. 
 
 Before showing the outcome of the analysis of a large corpus of jokes, the three 
circles will be briefly described in the next Sections. 
 
 
5.1. Circle 1: Make-sense frame 
 
  
Inferring the intended interpretation of the utterance involves the retrieval of 
information that is stored as accessible chunks of encyclopedic information 
(specifically stored as “I conceptualize X as p” or as a more factual “I believe that 
p”). This information is often constructed on the fly and almost unconsciously in 
order to make sense of the intended “scenario” for the comprehension of 
utterances. But the terminology used for describing this kind of mental storage is 
not uniform across authors and research schools. 
 Firstly, “frame” is a widely used term for this kind of commonsense 
information about the world and repeated situations, capturing the ‘typical’ 
features of the world, stereotyped situations, etc. Secondly, the term “schema” is 
often suggested for this kind of default general information. These are basic chunks 
of information that allow us to engage in daily experiences and classify them as 
prototypical instances. Finally, “script” is also commonly used in the analysis of 
this kind of information, but it refers more to sequences of actions. When the script 
is mentally activated, we expect certain events to take place in a certain order. 
 The scopes of these terms overlap enormously and many analysts treat them as 
interchangeable (cf. Tannen 1993). For example, Scollon and Scollon (2001: 67) 
seem to treat schemas and scripts as similar concepts. Bednarek (2005: 688) 
comments that these competing terms usually differ only in emphasis and cannot 
be easily distinguished. Therefore, I propose to group all of these terms under the 
generic label of make-sense frame. This term comprises three types of chunks of 
information that we invariably retrieve by default during comprehension:  
 (a) Word-associated schemas. We tend to attach a number of cognitive 
“encyclopedic features” (as I prefer to call them) to the referents of the words that 
we use in our daily interactions. These overlap to a greater or lesser extent with 
other people’s schemas of the same word, but differences arise both in personal 
and cultural backgrounds. In the case of metaphors, some inference is typically 
devoted to adjusting these conceptual features so that they can be effectively 
mapped onto target domains.  
 (b) Sequence-associated scripts, such as “coffee-shop,” that contain a number 
of prototypical, taken-for-granted actions such as finding a seat, determining one’s 
order, placing one’s order with the waiter or waitress, receiving one’s food and 
paying the bill at the cashier’s (Scollon and Scollon 2001: 67). 
 (c) Situation-associated frames, based on an accumulation of words whose 
conceptual referents suggest a prototypical situation such as “being at the doctor’s” 
or “buying food at the supermarket.” Instead of a list of predicted actions, as in (b) 
above, situation-associated frames are accumulations of concepts regarding a 
prototypical situation. 
 Needless to say, these make-sense frames are often exploited as part of a 
humorous intention, normally because the frame brought to bear so far in the 
interpretation of a stretch of the joke is inconsistent with the subsequent stretch and 
  
has to be changed (in Coulson’s 2001 terminology, there is often a frame shift 
during the interpretation of the joke). Indeed, the role of make-sense frames has 
been underlined in several theories of humor with variations in the semantics-
pragmatics interface. It is found in Koestler’s (1964) bisociation theory, according 
to which humor involves two self-consistent but totally incompatible frames of 
reference. It is also central in the Semantic Script Theory of Humor (Raskin 1985) 
and its continuation in the General Theory of Verbal Humor (Attardo and Raskin 
1991), whose central assumption is that information in the joke can be represented 
by abstract knowledge structures called “scripts” which often clash. Scripts are also 
present in informativeness approaches to jokes (cf. Attardo 2011: 141), according 
to which the hearer’s tendency to remain within one script clashes with a 
subsequent script. Finally, frames are also essential in Wenzel’s (1989) Frame-
Change Model, for which humor relies on a shift in frames, i.e. from a coherently 
apprehended one to a new one imposed on by the joke. 
 
 
5.2. Circle 2: Cultural frame 
 
People also store prototypical information about their culture and community. 
Instead of the personal storage of “I conceptualize X as p” or “I believe that p” that 
is typical of make-sense frames, in this case the individual acknowledges that 
certain information is typically cultural, stored as stereotypical chunks of 
information with the structure “in this culture, X is conceptualized as p” or “in this 
culture it is believed that p.” Both types of frames overlap to a certain extent, since 
some stereotypes may also be part of the individual’s own beliefs, whereas other 
stereotypes are clearly not supported by the individual. 
 In previous research, I distinguished between the mental representations which 
people consider their own acquired thoughts (labeled private beliefs), and those 
which they regard as belonging to a community (labeled metarepresented cultural 
beliefs), and which may match, contradict, overlap with, or complement each other 
(cf. Yus 2002, 2004, 2005). The ability to have parallel representations of the same 
referent, one regarded as private and the other ascribed to a culture, is an 
interesting human capacity which improves interaction with the environment. In 
this sense, cultural stereotypes are normally salient to a whole community, thus 
becoming what is usually called collective representations attributed to a whole 
social group (often in the form of stereotypes), and they need not be erased when a 
person privately constructs parallel but differing beliefs about the same referent. 
 Needless to say, these cultural stereotypes are often the only source of humor in 
certain jokes and their humorous effects seem to lie in the acknowledgment or 
strengthening (and occasionally contradiction) of these stereotypes. 
 
  
 
5.3. Circle 3: Utterance interpretation 
 
As was commented upon above, all the inferential steps leading to an interpretation 
of the utterance(s) in the joke may be exploited for the sake of humor, ranging 
from the identification of the logical form of the utterance to its inferential 
enrichment into a meaningful proposition, and also the construction of explicit 
and/or implicated interpretations (explicature/implicature). Needless to say, all 
jokes involve utterance interpretation and hearers have to fill the gap between what 
is coded in the joke and what is intended. The “joke interpretation circle” would be 
activated only when the inferential steps leading to an interpretation of the joke are 
manipulated by the speaker for the sake of humor. An example would be to play 
with disambiguation, i.e. when one sense of the word is clearly more likely to be 
selected but a second, more unlikely sense turns out to be the correct one. 
 
 
5.4. A new taxonomy of types of jokes 
 
These three sources of humor make up the ICM of humorous communication, 
which yields a taxonomy of seven types of jokes depending on whether the 
humorous strategy is based only on make-sense frames, cultural frames or 
utterance interpretation, or the speaker prefers to devise a strategy based on 
combinations of the Circles (these often collaborate to trick the hearer into 
selecting a certain interpretive path, see below). Seven types of jokes result 
depending on the activation of: (1) make-sense frame, cultural frame and utterance 
interpretation; (2) make-sense frame and cultural frame; (3) make-sense frame and 
utterance interpretation; (4) make-sense frame only; (5) cultural frame and 
utterance interpretation; (6) cultural frame only; and (7) utterance interpretation 
only. 
 This typology of jokes will be described and exemplified in the next Section, 
together with the results of the analysis of a large corpus of jokes. 
 
 
6. Analyzing jokes with the Intersecting Circles Model (ICM) 
 
6.1. Method 
 
A corpus of 1000 jokes was randomly collected and analyzed according to this 
Model: 500 from the joke repository jokes2go (http://www.jokes2go.net/) and 500 
from The Adult Joke Book (Sharpe 2004). Both sources comprise jokes in different 
sections containing commonly exploited sources of humor (jokes on bars, blondes, 
  
lawyers, doctors, religions, sex roles, etc.). These jokes were then analyzed and the 
underlying humorous strategies isolated. Next, the jokes were ascribed to any of 
the seven types predicted by the Model according to the shape of these strategies. 
In this sense, it should be stressed that, although the Model relies on three basic 
categories, these can only be said to be activated insofar as they do play a role in 
the generation of humorous effects. For example, hearers always make sense of the 
utterances they interpret and apply default frames to save mental effort. This is also 
at work in the case of jokes, but sometimes these frames are activated without 
really playing any role in the production of humorous effects, which lie, rather, in 
the other Circles, such as cultural stereotypes or utterance interpretation. Similarly, 
hearers always engage in an inferential enrichment of the words of the joke into a 
meaningful and contextualized proposition, since this is how interpretation of 
utterances invariably proceeds, but only when the inferential steps leading to an 
interpretation of the joke are manipulated for the sake of humor, would this joke be 
ascribed to the “utterance-interpretation Circle.” 
 Finally, a second analysis was carried out in order to determine whether there 
are sub-patterns of humorous strategies inside the preliminary typology of the 
Model into seven categories. 
 
 
6.2. General analysis 
 
One of the objectives of this paper was to check how the jokes in the corpus fit into 
one of the seven categories in the ICM. Specifically, the jokes in which make-sense 
frames play a role amount to 701. Cultural frames were found in only 130 jokes. 
Finally the steps involved in utterance interpretation are manipulated for the sake 
of humor in 565 jokes. 
 
Global results 
(701 jokes) 
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 
13 (1.3%) 22 (2.2%) 317 (31.7%) 349 
(34.9%) 
Type 3 
[make-sense / 
utterance 
interpretation] 
(317 jokes) 
Making sense of the joke with implicated premises/conclusions  
(165, 52.05%) 
Two valid interpretations of some portion of text (124, 39.11%) 
     a. Ambiguity at the beginning of utterance (4, 1.26%) 
     b. Ambiguity in the middle of utterance (78, 24.60%) 
     c. Ambiguity at the end of utterance (42, 13.25%) 
Two interpretations of the whole joke possible, only one valid 
(21, 6.62%) 
No resolution of incongruity, simultaneous entertainment (7, 2.20%) 
  
Type 4 
[make-sense] 
(349 jokes) 
Mild incongruity-resolution pattern (182, 52.14%) 
Clear incongruity-resolution pattern (140, 40.11%) 
Two interpretations of whole joke possible, only one valid (23, 6.59%) 
No resolution of incongruity, simultaneous entertainment (4, 1.14%) 
Table 1. Make-sense frame results. 
 
 Table 1 shows the results of the analysis of jokes in which make-sense frames 
play a part in the generation of humorous effects (types 1, 2, 3 and 4), and results 
for type 3 (make-sense frame and utterance interpretation) and type 4 (make-sense 
frame) are analyzed in more detail. Table 2 shows the sub-categories of jokes in 
which some form of social/cultural stereotype is strengthened or contradicted 
(types 1, 2, 5 and 6). Finally, Table 3 lists the percentages of jokes in which 
utterance interpretation is manipulated for the sake of humor (types 1, 3, 5 and 7), 
with special emphasis on type 3 (make-sense frame, utterance interpretation) and 
type 7 (utterance interpretation). 
 
Global results 
(130 jokes) 
Type 1 Type 2 Type 5 Type 6 
13 (10%) 22 (16.92%) 31 (23.84%) 64 (49.23%) 
Table 2. Cultural frame results. 
 
Global results 
(565 jokes) 
Type 1 Type 3 Type 5 Type 7 
13 (2.30%) 317 (56.10%) 31 (5.48%) 204 (36.10%) 
Global results 
[inferential strategies 
to reach an 
interpretation of the 
joke exploited for the 
sake of humor] 
Extraction of logical form from coded words (7, 1.41%) 
Reference assignment (63, 11.5%) 
Disambiguation (177, 30.74%) 
     a. polysemy (126, 22.30%) 
     b. homophony (8, 1.41%) 
     c. paronymy (phonetic similarity) (37, 6.54%) 
     d. sub-sentential utterances (6, 1.05%) 
Free enrichment (12, 2.12%) 
Concept adjustment (123, 21.76%) 
Playing with explicit/implicit interpretations (35, 6.18%) 
Retrieval/derivation of implicated premises and conclusions 
(217, 38.40%) 
  
Type 3 
[make-sense / 
utterance 
interpretation] 
(317 jokes) 
Extraction of logical form from coded words (2, 0.65%) 
Reference assignment (27, 8.51%) 
Disambiguation (88, 27.76%) 
     a. polysemy (78, 24.60%) 
     a.1. make-sense frame facilitates choice of one sense ( 
     63, 19.87%) 
     a.2. make-sense frame simply activated (15, 4.73%) 
     b. homophony (3, 0.94%) 
     c. paronymy (phonetic similarity) (7, 2.20%) 
Free enrichment (4, 1.26%) 
Concept adjustment (44, 13.88%) 
Playing with explicit/implicit interpretations (8, 2.52%) 
Retrieval/derivation of implicated premises and conclusions 
(184, 58.04%) 
Type 7 
[utterance 
interpretation] 
(204 jokes) 
Extraction of logical form from coded words (5, 2.45%) 
Reference assignment (28, 13.72%) 
Disambiguation (82, 40.19%) 
     a. polysemy (44, 21.56%) 
     b. homophony (5, 2.45%) 
     c. paronymy (phonetic similarity) (28, 13.72%) 
     d. sub-sentential utterance (5, 2.45%) 
Free enrichment (6, 2.94%) 
Concept adjustment (67, 32.84%) 
Playing with explicit/implicit interpretations (26, 12.74%) 
     a. implicit interpretation tuned explicit (22, 10.78%) 
     b. explicit interpretation turned implicit (4, 1.96%) 
Retrieval/derivation of implicated premises and conclusions 
(15, 7.35%) 
Table 3. Utterance interpretation results. 
 
 
6.3. Specific types of jokes in the corpus 
 
Joke type 1: Make-sense frame, cultural frame, utterance interpretation. In this 
joke type, the speaker’s humorous strategy involves acting upon the hearer’s 
utterance interpretation, the activation of make-sense frames and the recognition of 
cultural frames. Not many instances in the corpus fit this triple intersection of 
Circles (only 13 of them), but those which do reveal a very interesting humorous 
strategy. Consider the joke in (5) (Attardo 2008: 1205): 
 
(5) The pilot of a plane flying over the ocean comes on the intercom and announces that 
both engines are malfunctioning and the plane will crash in twenty minutes. Panic 
ensues. A young woman stands up and says: ‘I have never been with a man. I want to 
  
experience that before I die. Is there anyone who will make me feel like a real woman?’ 
A young man stands up, rips off his shirt, hands it to her and says: ‘Here! Iron this!’ 
 
 In (5), the hearer proceeds with the interpretation following a relevance-seeking 
criterion and makes sense of the airplane situation and the fact that there is an 
upcoming disaster facilitates the choice of “make love with a man” as the most 
relevant interpretation of “be with a man,” the coded concept of the word “man” 
being conceptually adjusted (narrowed) to meet the expectations of relevance (not 
any man but “a man who is a lover”). The same applies to “make me feel like a 
real woman,” which is easily interpreted as “give me pleasure” within the initiated 
sexual frame (while “woman” is adjusted into “a person given full sexual 
pleasure”). The end of the joke (Iron this!) brings incongruity into the 
interpretation and forces the hearer to engage in inferential backtracking and re-
interpreting the sexual phrase differently (feel like a real woman by performing a 
stereotypical female activity). Both the phrase and the sexual make-sense frame are 
potentially valid but the hearer had not noticed the latent possibilities because these 
are not as relevant. At the same time, the cultural stereotype of “woman as 
housewife” is conveyed and strengthened, providing additional relevance and 
justification for the increased mental effort. 
 Joke type 2: Make-sense frame, cultural frame. In this type of joke, make-sense 
frames and cultural frames are activated in the search for humorous effects. 22 
instances were isolated in the corpus. For example, joke (6), in which the hearer 
makes sense of the scenario of the joke and concludes that women are inferior to 
men (which in parallel corroborates the pervasive sex-role stereotype found in 
jokes), only to be invalidated at the end. The humor lies in contradicting the just-
activated cultural frame as a consequence of the activation of an accessible make-
sense frame. 
 
 (6) A man went to the doctor’s. The doctor came in and said, “Well, I’ve got some good 
news and some bad news. The bad news is that you have an inoperable brain tumor. The 
good news is our hospital has just been certified to do brain transplants. The man’s brain 
costs $100,000 and the woman’s brain costs $30,000.” The patient could not help but 
ask, “Why such a large difference between the male and the female brain?” The doctor 
replied, “The female brain is used.” 
 
 Joke type 3: Make-sense frame, utterance interpretation. Roughly one third of 
the jokes fit this type (317; see Table 1 and Table 3 for a detailed analysis of these 
type-3 jokes in the corpus). In this kind of joke, the inferential steps leading to an 
interpretation are manipulated by the speaker, who also predicts the construction of 
a make-sense frame. This frame plays a central role in directing the hearer towards 
the choice of an apparently relevant interpretation in its balance of interest 
(cognitive effects) and mental effort, which is invalidated. 
  
 Several patterns in the combination of make-sense frames and utterance 
interpretation arise from the corpus (cf. Table 1). Firstly, make-sense frames often 
entail the retrieval of implicated premises and the derivation of implicated 
conclusions (165 jokes, 52.05%). These implications are, at the same time, part of 
the interpretation of the utterance, triggered by the hearer’s search for a relevant 
interpretation of the joke. Therefore, a blurred intersecting area is created in which 
implications are needed both for building up a make-sense frame and for reaching 
an appropriate interpretation of the utterance. For instance, the humorous effects of 
joke (7a) below lie in the hearer’s retrieval of the implicated premise (7b) and 
derivation of the implicated conclusions (7c) about the effects of marriage, which 
can be considered both part of utterance interpretation and part of the hearer’s 
construction of a make-sense frame for the end of the joke: 
 
 (7) a.  A dietician was once addressing a large audience in Chicago. “Red meat is awful. 
Vegetables can be disastrous, and none of us realizes the germs in our drinking 
water. But there is one thing that is the most dangerous of all and we all of us eat it. 
Can anyone here tell me what lethal product I’m referring to? You, sir, in the first 
row, please give us your idea.” The man lowered his head and said, “Wedding 
cake.” 
 b. Implicated premise: Wedding cake is served after marriage ceremonies. 
  c.  Implicated conclusions: He thinks marriage is a bad idea; he has suffered from a bad 
experience with marriage.3 
 
 Secondly, make-sense frames also combine with some potentially ambiguous 
part of the joke to generate humorous effects, for example by making one sense of 
a polysemous word more relevant and easy to select. Although I predicted this 
ambiguous part to be mostly located at the end of the joke and fit the incongruity-
resolution pattern (Suls 1972), more instances were found to fit the setup-
incongruity-resolution (or SIR) pattern (Attardo 1997), with the ambiguous chunk 
of text located roughly in the middle of the joke (78 jokes, 24.60%). This fits 
nicely with the “incremental” relevance-seeking interpretive procedure in which 
the assumptions from previously processed discourse form a preliminary 
background for the interpretation of subsequent chunks of text, as happens with the 
disambiguation of “bat” in the following example, facilitated by the preceding text: 
 
(8) a. Your team is disqualified from the baseball game. Peter’s bat is too grey. 
 b. We’ve chosen John’s mouse for the experiment. Peter’s bat is too grey. 
 
 In the case of many type-3 jokes, the hearer first builds up a make-sense 
scenario that saves effort for the interpretation of subsequent stretches of discourse. 
The choice of an interpretation of the ambiguous part is facilitated by the 
assumptions still active from previously processed discourse and by expectations 
of frame congruence, only to be invalidated at a subsequent part of the joke. 
  
Finally, a resolution is found in a third phase, normally resolved by the hearer’s 
inferential backtracking to re-interpret the joke, as in (9) and (10): 
 
(9)   A policeman stops a lady and asks for her license. He says “Lady, it says here that 
you should be wearing glasses.” The woman answered “Well, I have contacts.” The 
policeman replied “I don’t care who you know! You’re getting a ticket!” 
(10)  A doctor and a nurse were called to the scene of an accident. Doctor: We need to get 
these people to a hospital now! Nurse: What is it? Doctor: It’s a big building with a 
lot of doctors, but that’s not important now! 
 
In these jokes, the make-sense frame in the setup makes it easy for the hearer to 
find a relevant (i.e. accessible) meaning for “contacts” (without realizing that it is 
polysemous) and a valid referent for “it” in “What is it?,” both located in the 
middle of the joke. The next part of the joke creates the incongruity, provoking an 
inferential backtracking. This is costly in terms of mental effort but compensated 
for by an offset of cognitive (i.e. humorous) effects. 
 A third –and less frequent– pattern found in the corpus is when two 
interpretations of the whole utterance (not of part of it) are possible, only one of 
which is eventually correct (21 jokes, 6.62%). In (11), for example, at the end of 
the joke we are reminded that the whole joke has to be disambiguated and re-
interpreted: 
 
(11)  It was laying limp in my hand. It was very long, kind of thin. I slid it between my 
fingers until I got to the end of it. I was turning it on. It became firm in my hands, 
and the end was wet. Then it got very hard and began gushing out of the tip. Then I 
took the garden hose and watered the bushes. 
 
Finally, in a fourth pattern the incongruity is left unresolved, since both 
interpretations are valid and the hearer is invited to process and entertain them in 
parallel (7 instances, 2.20%). This pattern fits Ritchie’s (2009: 6) alternative 
interpretation contrast, according to which neither interpretation is defined as 
having priority, with the incongruity arising from the mutual clash, as happens in 
(12): 
 
(12)  A young husband with an inferiority complex insisted he was just a little pebble on 
a vast beach. The marriage counselor, trying to be creative, told him, “If you wish to 
save your marriage, you’d better be a little boulder.” 
 
 As in any metaphor, this joke entails a conceptual adjustment of “pebble” so 
that the underlying concept can be mapped onto a person. The end of the joke 
entails a disambiguation of “boulder” (paronymy, phonetic similarity) into 
“boulder/bolder” and generates two interpretations, both of which are valid and 
entertained simultaneously without the hearer being able to choose the most 
  
relevant one. The humorous effects lie precisely in the entertainment of these 
simultaneous possibilities. 
 The analysis of sub-strategies for utterance interpretation in joke type 3 (cf. 
Table 3) revealed that, besides ambiguous terms, and as predicted in previous 
research (Yus 2003, 2008, 2012a), all the stages in utterance interpretation can be 
exploited for the sake of humor, ranging from the initial decoding of the words 
uttered into a logical form (as in (13) below) to the inferential comprehension of 
explicit and implicated meanings with the aid of context. The most frequent 
strategy is the aforementioned retrieval/derivation of implicated premises and 
conclusions in parallel to building up make-sense frames. Disambiguation, already 
mentioned above, is also frequent (27.76%), with polysemy as the most common 
sub-task (24.60%), also at work for “field” in joke (13) below. Concept adjustment 
is exploited in several jokes which play with expected vs. unexpected ad hoc 
meanings of coded concepts in context (13.88%). 
 
(13)  A man is driving down a country road, when he spots a farmer standing in the 
middle of a huge field of grass. He pulls the car over to the side of the road and 
notices that the farmer is just standing there, doing nothing, looking at nothing. The 
man gets out of the car, walks all the way out to the farmer and asks him, “Ah 
excuse me mister, but what are you doing?” The farmer replies, “I’m trying to win a 
Nobel Prize.” “How?” asks the man, puzzled.” Well, I heard they give the Nobel 
Prize... to people who are out standing in their field.” 
 
   Logical form 1: people who are [out] [standing] [in their field]. 
   Logical form 2: people who are [outstanding] [in their field]. 
 
 6.3.4. Joke type 4: Make-sense frame. 349 jokes resort to make-sense frames as 
the main or only source of humorous effects, without needing the aid of the 
manipulation of utterance interpretation or the activation of cultural frames. All of 
the jokes in this type comply with the incongruity-resolution pattern (cf. Table 1). 
However, 40.11% of these type-four jokes offer a very mild form of incongruity 
that generates little cognitive dissonance. This sub-type contrasts with a more 
surprising incongruity-resolution pattern à la Suls (1972) in 52.14% of the jokes. 
These are exemplified in jokes (14) and (15) respectively: 
 
(14)  Sherlock Holmes and Doctor Watson went on a camping trip to Dartmoor and as 
they lay down for the night Sherlock Holmes said, “Doctor Watson, my old friend, 
when you look up into the darkness, please tell me what you see.” “Well, I can see a 
very clear sky, there are no clouds... the Milky Way and the planet Venus.” Watson 
laughed and said, “But knowing you, Sherlock, I’m sure there are many things I 
have missed. What have you deduced?” There was a moment’s silence and then 
Holmes replied, “Somebody’s nicked our tent.” 
(15)  Bill sat alone in the hospital room at his dying wife’s beside. Her voice was little 
  
more than a hoarse whisper. “Bill darling,” she breathed. “I’ve got a confession to 
make before I go... I ... I’m the one who took the $10,000 from your safe in the 
house... I spent it on a fling with your best friend Jimmy...” “That’s all right dearest; 
don’t even give it a second thought.” said Bill. “I have a small confession too. I’m 
the one who poisoned you.” 
 
 6.3.5. Joke type 5: Cultural frame, utterance interpretation. Sometimes cultural 
frames and utterance interpretation are jointly exploited for the humorous outcome 
of the joke. Only 31 instances of the corpus fit this type. Most of them strengthen a 
cultural stereotype with the aid of disambiguation, as in (16), in which the 
humorous outcome is based on strengthening the negative qualities of lawyers 
(cultural frame) but also on the resolution of the ambiguity of “serve” (utterance 
interpretation): 
 
(16)  A man and his alligator walk into a bar and the man asks, “Does this bar serve 
lawyers?” “Of course we do,” replied the bartender.” Great,” said the man, “I’d like 
a beer... and give me a lawyer for my alligator.” 
 
 6.3.6. Joke type 6: Cultural frame. For 64 jokes in the corpus, strengthening or 
contradicting cultural frames seems to be the only source of humor, with no need 
of either make-sense frames or manipulated steps for utterance interpretation (cf. 
Yus 2002, 2004, 2005). Stereotypes include professions, sex roles, national 
identities, specific connoted places, family roles, etc. An example of one of these 
stereotypes is provided in (17): 
 
(17) Q: When does a person decide to become an accountant? 
  A: When he realizes he doesn’t have the charisma to succeed as an undertaker. 
 
 6.3.7. Joke type 7: Utterance interpretation. Finally, as analyzed in previous 
research (Yus 2003, 2008, 2012a, forthcoming), some manipulation of the 
interpretive strategies leading to a relevant interpretation of the joke seem to be the 
only source of humorous effects in 204 jokes. These typically play with polysemy, 
ambiguity, punning, conceptual adjustment, the explicit/implicit likelihood of 
interpretations and the derivation of implications with the aid of context. Table 3 
lists the specific relevance-seeking inferential strategies and percentages (for the 
jokes in the corpus) which are manipulated for the sake of humor. In this joke type, 
after the hearer has identified the logical form of the stretches of text, the speaker 
can predict that he/she will engage in its inferential enrichment into a meaningful 
contextualized interpretation. All the sub-strategies involved in this inferential 
activity can be exploited for the generation of humorous effects, starting from 
reference assignment (28 jokes, 13.72%). Concerning disambiguation, polysemy is 
the most typical source of humor (44 jokes, 21.56%), above paronymy (28 jokes, 
  
13.72%), homophony (5 jokes, 2.45%) and ambiguous sub-sentential utterances (5 
jokes, 2.45%). Free enrichment was not frequently used as a source of humor (6 
jokes, 2.94%). By contrast, concept adjustment was relatively often used as a 
source of humorous effects. (67 jokes, 32.84%), especially those containing 
metaphors, since all of them involve conceptual adjustment, as happens with 
“woman is an ice cube” in (18): 
 
(18)  A man went into a bar and ordered a gin and tonic. When it was placed before him, 
he exclaimed, “My goodness, an ice cube with a hole in it, that’s new.” “No it 
isn’t,” commented a sullen looking man sitting next to him. “I married one.” 
 
The outcome of these inferential strategies is the explicit content of the joke, now 
fully contextualized and communicated as an explicature. This interpretation can 
then be used as one of the premises for the derivation of implicatures. In this sense, 
26 jokes (12.74%) fitting joke-type 7 play with alternative explicit versus implicit 
meanings of phrases. The humorous pattern is to force the hearer into entertaining 
simultaneously both the accessible and typical implicit interpretation of a phrase 
(e.g. an idiom) and its literal counterpart, as in (19): 
 
(19)  The phone rings and the husband answers it. “No, mate, you want the Met Office.” 
“Who was that, darling?” asks the wife. “I don’t know, I think he wanted the 
weather forecast, because he asked me if the coast was clear.” 
 
 
7. Concluding remarks and prospects of research 
 
The ICM predicts that all jokes involve the manipulation of any of three areas 
(Circles) or their combinations: make-sense frame, cultural frame and utterance 
interpretation, aided by the prediction of the hearer’s relevance-seeking inferential 
steps. The analysis of a corpus of 1000 jokes corroborated this prediction. 
However, the corpus is mainly made up of jokes in the Anglosaxon context, since 
the repository jokes2go.net contains American jokes and The adult joke book is a 
selection of English jokes. It would be interesting to check the extent to which 
jokes from a different cultural context yield the same percentages and sub-
categories as the ones commented upon in this paper. Many of the jokes analyzed 
for this paper will probably suit any cultural context, whereas others will be more 
typical in a specific cultural area. Besides, it would be interesting to check the 
influence of the languages themselves in the frequency of specific joke types. 
Speakers may take advantage of the formal features and resources of languages 
differently in order to create humorous effects. Hence the percentage of jokes 
involving a manipulation of (decoding and) inferential steps associated with their 
phonotactic constraints, homonymy, polysemy, phrasal boundaries, intra-sentential 
  
structures, etc. may be higher in some languages than in others. This will be 
addressed in future research. 
 
 
Notes 
 
  1. I would like to thank Luz Gil, José Mateo, Manuel Padilla and Agnieszka 
Piskorska for their comments on a draft of this paper. 
  2. Utterance interpretation will be used in italics when referring to one of the 
Circles in the ICM. 
  3. A reviewer of this paper pointed out that joke (7) also involves the activation 
of the “cultural frame circle.” In the context of this paper, cultural frames involve 
information about cultures, countries, professions, etc. that the hearer regards as 
stereotypical, as part of the collective storage of information (in this culture it is 
believed that p), and often not matching his/her personal beliefs and opinions on 
the same referent (I believe that p). In my opinion, there is no cultural stereotype of 
the type “marriage is harmful for one’s health,” but if that was the case, then joke 
(7) would shift to Type 1. 
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